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Abstract 
 
Purpose: Focussing on the UK’s institutional real estate universe, this paper analyses variations in the 
operational management of real estate investment portfolios.  For the main categories of institutional 
investors, the key tasks in real estate operational management and the ways in which these tasks are 
typically bundled and categorised by investment managers are reviewed. Three broad operational 
management models are outlined.  Case studies of real estate operational management models in 
practice are discussed.    
  
Approach: The research approach is primarily descriptive drawing upon illustrative investor case 
studies.   
 
Findings: A range of operating models are identified for managing real estate investment portfolios. 
Specialists real estate investors tend to have highly vertically integrated operating models viewing 
most operational management functions as core operational capabilities. Multi-asset owners tend to 
have a vertically disintegrated operating model outsourcing fund, asset, property and facilities 
management. Investing institutions such as fund houses and specialist real estate investment advisors 
seem to have converged upon a common hybrid operating model with high margin, analytical functions 
such as fund and asset management being insourced and low margin, routine functions such as property 
and facilities management being outsourced.    
  
Originality/value: Despite the size of the global, institutional real estate investment universe (estimated 
by DTZ to be worth more than USD 13.6 trillion in 2015), the topic of how (and how effectively) these 
assets are managed by institutional investors has attracted very little attention from the real estate 
research community.  This paper provides some initial analysis and insights into operational 
management models for real estate investment portfolios in the contemporary real estate investment 
management landscape.  
  
Introduction  
 
As a real asset class, a key characteristic of direct investment in real estate assets is that it requires a 
relatively substantial (if variable) operational management input by investors, external suppliers and/or 
occupiers. It can be easy to underestimate the range of tasks that need to be performed or procured by 
owners and occupiers in order to operate the diverse and often complex bundles of technology, 
materials, services, financial flows, legal obligations, regulatory responsibilities, contractual and 
business relationships and associated risks embedded in commercial real estate assets.  For investors 
and occupiers, real estate operational management can be a cost, a profit centre, a potential core 
capability, and a source of competitive advantage and added value. For investors specifically, 
improvements to operational efficiency and effectiveness can enhance investment performance.  For 
each investing organisation, an important decision is how to identify and deliver the optimal operating 
model for real estate management functions such as fund, asset, property and facilities management. 
 
In a dynamic real estate investment sector, there is limited up-to-date description and analysis of the 
investor and operational landscape. From an institutional economics perspective, the market outcome 
in terms of real estate operational management models can be framed as path dependent and contingent 
upon a combination of historic chance and deliberate agency. Feedback effects can ‘lock in’ a particular 
market outcome that has (by chance) emerged from multiple potential equilibrium states.  In the UK, 
the long-term presence of large institutional investors (mainly occupational pension funds and insurance 
companies) has generated the initial conditions for the growth of third party fund, asset and property 
management services. In turn, the presence of these third party providers expedited the vertical 
disintegration of many real estate operational management services.   
 
Until the 1990s, the most common operational management model involved the majority of operational 
management functions being internally delivered by a single investment organisation.  However, over 
the last two decades, in many markets there seems to have been a secular shift towards outsourcing 
many operational management functions adopting a market approach to the governance of these 
functions.  Paradoxically, at the same time some major real estate investment organisations have 
persisted with a hierarchical governance approach regarding most real estate operational management 
functions as core competencies meriting an in-house capability.  Using the UK market as a case study, 
this paper explores these differences in real estate operational management models.   
 
As noted above, although there will be ‘legacy’ issues, when operating real estate assets, owners and 
investment managers need to decide upon an operational management strategy.  They can choose to 
outsource or insource the different operational management functions or to adopt different solutions for 
different markets, sectors or functions.  If delivering an operational management task themselves, it is 
implicitly expected that the trade-off between service quality and cost will be superior to a third party 
solution. As well as depending on the presence, competency and cost of third party providers, the 
optimal operational solution will also hinge on the competency, capacity and costs of investor or 
investment managers to deliver the service. Some investors may conclude that they have little 
competitive advantage in any operational management functions for any real estate assets in any 
markets.  Others may conclude that they have competitive advantage compared to third party providers 
in some markets and sectors particularly where they are regarded as core and/or critical to their business 
model.  Close control of the operational management of key assets may be critical to some investors or 
investment managers.  They may also conclude that certain key operational management tasks or 
functions are delivered best internally whilst it is optimal to adopt third party solutions for others. The 
range of potential operational models is large with each real estate investor able to create their own 
bespoke model.     
 
The focus of this paper is on the operational management of direct equity investments in real estate 
assets (as opposed to indirect investments or real estate debt markets).  Although there is some 
description of market practices, the paper is not primarily empirical.   It is not based upon systematic 
research involving quantitative or qualitative surveys of practice.  A small number of interviews (3) 
were carried out in order to fill in gaps in areas where the author was unsure of current practice in terms 
of operating model.  Some limited content analysis of annual reports, websites etc. was performed to 
confirm or identify practice and Falkenbach et al’s (2017) paper was also helpful in gathering evidence 
of current (2016-7) practices.  The reminder of the paper is organised as follows.  The first section 
provides an overview of the key tasks in the operational management of commercial real estate 
portfolios and the ways in which these tasks are typically bundled and categorised by investment 
managers and third party service providers.  This section is followed by an analysis of the main 
categories of institutional investors in commercial real estate in terms of their geographical, sector and 
asset foci and their operating and business models.  Mainly focussing on asset and property 
management, the third section outlines three broad operational management models used by real estate 
investors and investment managers. With a specific focus on the UK market and the decision whether 
to insource or outsource property management, the fourth section discusses the UK real estate market.  
This is followed by an analysis of the property management sector in the UK.  Examples of real estate 
operational management models in practice in the UK are then discussed.  Finally, conclusions are 
drawn.     
 
Real Estate Operational Management: A Task Audit 
 
Operational (or operations) management is typically concerned with the design, management and 
improvement of operational systems. Largely focused on process and strategy, it tends to be concerned 
with the effective deployment of resources to produce services and products.  In the context of direct 
real estate investment, it relates to how the delivery of the wide range of operational tasks or functions 
associated with fund, asset, property and facilities management as well as specialist real estate functions 
and ancillary support services is structured, procured and delivered.  Even within the broad operational 
models outlined later in this paper, there can be numerous permutations in terms of how real estate 
investment organisations structure the internal and/or external delivery different (bundles of) 
operational tasks and functions.    
 
Although real estate operational management tasks will be broadly similar in most markets, before 
considering the operational management models in more detail it is worth briefly re-iterating the broad 
range of tasks that need to be performed when operating real estate investment assets. Whilst there is 
invariably a significant degree of consultation, collaboration and even co-production between different 
roles and organisations, the typical allocation of operational tasks is set out in Table 1.  
 
Insert Table 1 around here 
Geltner (2003) presented a model of the four fundamental property level investment management 
functions of; property selection, acquisition transaction execution, operational management and and 
disposition transaction execution. Below, Geltner’s basic model is extended to illustrate where and how 
these four core investment management activities may affect investment performance. The models are 
based largely on deductive reasoning. Some of the premises of the models would be regarded as self-
evident e.g. stock selection asset allocation are important determinants of investment performance.  
Others would be less self-evident e.g. operational model influences investment performance, higher 
tenant satisfaction leads to lower voids etc. and are far from empirically proven.  
 
Focussing first on property and facilities management, as illustrated in Figure 1 there is likely to be a 
degree of conflict between cost and quality in the transmission mechanism from property and facilities 
management to investment performance.  Similar to many business operations, optimising the cost-
service level trade-off is a key calibration. Albeit a large proportion of the costs may be recoverable 
through service charges (see below), property and facilities management is a direct cost to real estate 
investors. Consequently, the relative productivity of property and facilities management service 
providers will produce variations in this cost which will directly affect the level of net income received. 
All else equal, the less efficient the provider, the higher will be the direct cost to the investor and 
occupier.  More indirectly, lower operating expenses will tend to have positive effects on demand for 
the asset from existing and potential occupiers. The expected transmission mechanism here is tenant 
satisfaction. Where occupiers are satisfied with the cost and quality of property and facilities 
management, it seems reasonable to assume that they are more likely to pay rent and service charges 
on time and to remain in the property. In addition and in conjunction with facilities and asset managers, 
property managers are also in a position to identify potential opportunities to add value to assets and 
enhance income and capital returns (or reduce risks) by executing unplanned interventions to improve 
the tenant, lease structures, building, use, legal title etc.    
 
However, the main responsibility for identifying and executing value add opportunities at the asset level 
lies mainly with the asset manager.  As set out in Figures 2, their core responsibilities can be to instruct, 
coordinate with and (sometimes) monitor property and facilities managers, execute acquisitions and 
disposals and to add value to the assets.  It is also worth noting that there has been a growing trend to 
shift the responsibility for monitoring the performance of property managers from asset managers to 
specialists.  Where property management is outsourced, these roles typically involve the procurement 
and performance monitoring of property management services.  Often the role is described as Director 
or Head of Operations. When internally delivered, the property management team may be structured to 
provide career progression in specialist property management roles.            
For asset managers, ‘adding value’ tends to involve discretionary managerial interventions by the real 
estate asset manager with the aim of improving assets’ risk-adjusted performance. Often labelled active 
asset management, it encompasses modifying assets’ legal, physical, use, financial and occupational 
structures and attributes in order to increase value. Generally requiring an entrepreneurial outlook, 
common interventions include upgrading and reconfiguring buildings and their services, extending the 
building, improving tenant quality, improving lease structures, shifting to highest and best use, 
removing onerous legal restrictions on legal titles etc.  In shopping centres, commercialisation or 
speciality leasing strategies have generated a growing range of sector-specific opportunities for 
‘alternative’ revenue generation.  
 
Supervised by Investment Committees, clients and fund managers and advised by a range of specialists, 
asset managers are often responsible for sourcing and executing the acquisition and disposal of 
individual assets.  However, even for this single operational function, there is a debate about the best 
operational approach. McAllister, Hughes and Gallimore (2006) found a clear dichotomy between 
organisations in their use of either in-house transaction specialists or asset managers to execute 
transactions. Organisations who had transaction specialists tended to emphasise the importance of quick 
responses, focus on sourcing stock and market contact and knowledge.  Organisations who combine the 
roles of asset management and transaction execution stressed the risk control aspects of buyers 
managing the assets that they purchase. However, they also identified a trade-off in that the quality of 
asset management could be adversely affected by the diversion of resources devoted to acquiring or 
disposing of stock. 
 
Fund managers generally influence the operational management of real estate assets through their 
strategic decision-making. The transmission of their core responsibilities to portfolio returns and risks 
are illustrated in Figure 3. Their asset allocation strategies for sector and geographical capital 
deployment and decisions on stock acquisition and disposal along with capital structuring will almost 
certainly generate their most significant impact on real estate portfolio’s risk-adjustment performance. 
However, whilst the operating model is a strategic investment management decision, very little is 
actually known about the relative importance and impact of operating model on investment 
performance. 
Insert Figures 1-3 around here             
 
The Investing Institutions 
 
An evaluation of the various operational solutions for real estate investment strategies is complicated 
by the sheer diversity and complexity of the real estate investment (management) sector.  Broadly, many 
categories of investor will be both consumers and producers of third party fund and asset management 
services. The lines between advisors, managers and investors have become increasingly blurred. Baum 
and Hartzell (2012, 9) referred to the creation of “a more complex industry structure and a confusion of 
ownership and management”.  The ‘pure’ investors (who outsource to third party investment managers) 
tend to be trusts, small and medium sized pension funds, foundations, endowments, sovereign wealth 
funds and high net worth individuals. Whilst a small proportion of the former will offer third party fund 
and asset management services, the investment management sector generally comprises large pension 
funds, insurers, fund houses, specialist real estate investment managers, investment banks and private 
equity funds who essentially act as aggregators of institutional capital.  Often cooperating and 
competing using a myriad of separate accounts, non-discretionary mandates, pooled funds, joint 
ventures and investment platforms, some of these investing organisations are both simultaneously 
clients and providers of third party real estate asset management services.  The major full service 
investment banks offer their own suite of real estate investment products and investment management 
services which are often relatively minor elements of their wider business.  
 
Hybrid business models are common with investing organisations such as Hines, Brookfield and 
Tishman Speyer specialising in investing in, operating and developing real estate assets across many 
national markets.  They offer third party real estate fund, asset and property management services, a 
range of pooled investment funds and platforms, engage in joint ventures and partnerships and operate 
through subsidiaries etc.  They may be investing their own capital and/or offering third investment 
management services (and asset and property management services) and/or engaging in real estate 
development and/or launching and managing listed and unlisted real estate funds (both equity and debt) 
and/or participating in real estate lending directly.  REITs, listed real estate companies and funds, 
private real estate companies and funds also typically deliver fund, asset and property management 
internally.  Whilst most REITs and private real estate companies usually to do not offer these services 
to third parties, they often engage in joint ventures with investors who wish to access their skill set and 
asset base.      
 
Table 2 sets out the main real estate investment organisations and outlines the way that real estate 
investment fits into their business models.   Each of these clients/investment managers has their own 
unique investment objectives, constraints, corporate culture, capacity and competency, comparative and 
competitive advantages and end-customer.  Whatever the scale, scope and model of their business and 
their culture, core competencies and capabilities etc., all have a common aspiration to deliver high 
quality operational solutions for their assets under management.  The result of this diversity of investors 
and investment managers is a variety of operational and business models across the real estate 
investment management sector. Each real estate manager needs to decide which real estate operational 
management functions to deliver in-house and which functions to outsource based on various aspects 
of their business model.   
Real Estate Operational Management Models 
 
In practice, most real estate operational management models fall in between the two extremes of fully 
insourced and fully outsourced operational functions.  In essence, nearly all real estate investment 
managers take some variation of a “mix and match” approach, performing some real estate operational 
management functions internally while engaging third party providers to execute others. As a result, 
there is no simple categorisation of third party providers and no single optimal model for the role of 
third party providers in real estate operational management and, more specifically, in property 
management. All investment managers have at least some degree of reliance on third party providers 
for some real estate operational management functions. 
 
There are numerous permutations for procuring the broad range of real estate operational management 
services required.  The main three broad categories are a primarily vertically integrated model, a 
partially vertically disintegrated model and a primarily vertically disintegrated model.  The latter 
involves the delivery of the vast majority of operational management tasks and functions by third party 
providers. Typically, the investing organisations will retain ownership of the assets appointing third 
party investment managers using non-discretionary mandates in segregated accounts. Normally, the 
third party investment manager will also deliver asset management as well as fund management 
services.  As discussed in detail below, third party investment managers will often tend to ‘subcontract’ 
property and facilities management to another third party provider or providers.  
 
Whilst there will be a number of notable exceptions, as noted above it is typically sovereign wealth 
funds, endowment funds, small pension funds, charitable foundations and family offices that adopt this 
operational model.  It can often be in conjunction with indirect real estate investment through various 
types of pooled funds where ownership as well as control of the real estate assets remains with the fund 
management organisation.  Although many of these investors will have large real estate portfolios, the 
assets can be spread across global real estate markets and across a number of real estate sectors. In 
addition to fund, asset, property and facilities management, the execution of such international real 
estate investment strategies involves significant fixed costs in setting up and running a local operational 
platform and/or close relationships with local suppliers of a range of support services including 
brokerage, research, legal, accounting and tax advice inter alia.  
 
Operational Management Models  
 
A primarily vertically integrated or insourced model involves the delivery of most operational 
management tasks by the investing organisation itself. As noted above, until the last two or three 
decades this was probably the most common operational management model.  However, over the same 
timeframe, like most of business sectors, there has been a structural trends towards outsourcing 
activities considered non-core.  However, it is notable that different investing organisations managing 
similar types of real estate assets have taken very different views about whether essential business 
processes such as fund, asset and property management are core.   
 
A partially vertically disintegrated model involves the delivery of some operational management tasks 
by third party providers.  There are numerous options in terms of how the different tasks are procured 
and delivered. A common approach is to insource activities perceived to be high margin, high added 
value and complex analytical business processes such as asset and fund management where a 
competitive advantage is perceived.  Business processes perceived to be low margin and low value add 
where there can be a large number of alternative  service providers or a single third party provider for 
each role and task will tend to be outsourced.  In particular, property and facilities management have 
increasingly then been perceived to be fairly commoditised activities. For both insourced and 
outsourced operating models, there are the numerous possibilities in terms of structuring how real estate 
portfolios and personnel can be grouped – by real estate sector, geographically, by fund or client.   
 
Before looking at the UK’s commercial real estate sector specifically, it’s worth re-iterating that the 
decision to insource or outsource an operational function is not binary. Investors may choose to manage 
part of the portfolio internally and to outsource asset and /or property management for specialist assets 
or for assets that are considered too geographically remote to manage from a main office. For instance, 
for a segregated fund (where a pension fund has outsourced the vast majority of operational 
management functions to an institutional investment manager), the institutional investment manager 
may choose to retain fund and most asset management functions in-house. It may outsource property 
management functions to a range of separate suppliers (e.g. Supplier A for shopping centres, Supplier 
B for residential, Supplier C for office and industrial etc.). ‘Alternative’ asset classes e.g. student 
accommodation, asset and property management functions may be outsourced to a single supplier.  In 
turn, a whole range of other third party providers may be used for specialist services such as leasing, 
valuation, real estate taxation, etc. which tend to be outside the normal scope of property and asset 
management.  Hence, the potential for relatively hybridised in-house and third party supplier networks 
is also significant. 
 
The UK Market Context 
 
Topping JLL’s Global Real Estate Transparency Index in 2018, the UK has a highly mature real estate 
market.  With a large private pensions sector and a high preponderance of leasing rather than owning 
among businesses, there has been a long tradition of professional real estate services firms. The service 
providers operate under a professional self-regulating model dominated by the RICS. Currently with 
over 100,000 members globally, the RICS received its royal charter in 1881. The RICS produce 
numerous professional statements, codes, practice notes, information papers etc. that form a core 
component of the professional self-regulation of a wide range of real estate services. They tend to focus 
on common governance themes such as clarity and fairness in terms of engagement, maintenance of 
conflicts of interest databases and reference to complaints-handling procedures and redress 
schemes.   In 2016, the RICS released the Real Estate Management Professional Statement to advise 
members on aspects of their work in this area (RICS, 2016).  It recommends procedures for specific 
professional tasks intended to represent best practice.  Its Information Paper in 2016 provided detailed 
information about the roles and functions of property, asset and fund managers (RICS, 2016).   
 
For the UK, the IPF (2017) estimated that the commercial real estate investment universe was worth 
approximately £486 billion in 2016 representing around 400 million square feet of space.  MSCI (2018) 
estimate that, in 2017, it was the third largest institutional real estate investment market accounting for 
approximately 10% of the global universe.   To non-UK readers, it may be striking that there is relatively 
little institutional investment in the residential sector with student accommodation and the Private 
Rented Sector accounting for an additional £37 billion of assets. However, institutional involvement in 
such ‘alternative’ sectors has been growing rapidly. Although the concepts of domestic and non-
domestic are becoming increasingly difficult to disentangle, it was estimated that nearly 30% of the 
total was owned by non-domestic investors. The weight of London is notable.  It accounted for £250 
billion of the £486 billion.  Whilst there is no standard nomenclature, the largest groups of investors 
were collective investment funds (£79 billion), REITs and listed companies (£74 billion) and private 
companies (£60 billion).          
 
A notable feature of the regulatory regime regarding services charges in the UK is that that much of the 
cost of managing multi-let assets is payable by the tenant through the service charge.  Indeed, owners 
are permitted to generate a profit from the delivery of services.  The RICS Professional Statement 
Service Charges in Commercial Property states 
“The management fees charged shall comprise only the reasonable costs and overheads 
borne in the process of operating and managing the services. These would also reflect the 
actual work necessary to fulfil the principles of this professional statement. It is recognised 
that whoever is providing the service is entitled to cover their costs and overheads, 
including a reasonable profit element.” (RICS, 2018, 14) 
 
This also includes irregular charges for administering non-routine events such as permissions to alter 
the premises, sublet etc. Where third party providers are involved, additional services that are not 
specified in the property management agreement will involve additional payments subject to 
negotiation.  Typically, owners pay a separate fixed fee for rent collection and other management 
services.  This may be on a per lease or per building basis. 
 
 
As one of the most globalised and financialised commercial real estate markets, it could be argued that 
it is inappropriate to refer to the UK context.  In a European setting, London has the largest geographical 
cluster of human capital in real estate support services.  It is a major destination of, source of and 
‘entrepôt’ for cross-border real estate capital flows. The main offices of the leading full service real 
estate services providers e.g. CBRE, Cushman and Wakefield and JLL are located there.  In addition, 
the major global and European real estate information and benchmarking services are in London e.g. 
MSCI, PMA, CoStar and RCA.  Nearly all major global investment managers have offices in London 
which, in turn, is a leading centre of corporate real estate and FM knowledge.  London is also a cluster 
of large groups of advanced producer service providers e.g. accountancy, legal, banking etc.: many of 
which have large sections that specialise in real estate.   
 
The wider commercial real estate market has been characterised by “increasing options for investing in 
real estate internationally, with a series of more robust and better-governed investment platforms 
covering most of the world’s real estate markets.” (Aussant et al, 2014, 3), Perhaps not surprisingly, in 
a study of foreign investment in commercial real estate in 28 major European cities, McAllister and 
Nanda (2016) found that London alone accounted for more than 50% of transactions (by value) 
involving non-domestic investors.  The execution of such international real estate investment strategies 
often involves significant fixed costs requiring a local operational platform and/or close relationships 
with local suppliers of a range of support services including brokerage, research, asset and property 
management, legal, accounting and tax advice inter alia. There are also significant scale economies 
associated with many search, holding and operating costs. As a result, it has become increasingly 
difficult to categorise many real estate investment organisations by nationality or business focus. 
 
There is very little literature on the structure of the contemporary real estate investment management 
sector. Vistra (2018), a major provider of fund administration services, provide a broad overview of the 
evolution in the real estate investment management sector.  They argue that the sector has been 
increasingly subject to pressure for increased operational efficiency and cost-effectiveness. Vistra 
discuss a number of fairly familiar trends including the consolidation of operations with fewer 
outsourcing partners, an increased propensity to use dedicated procurement functions to appoint and 
oversee third party service providers and a growth in the range of services outsourced by fund managers.  
Reinforcing the discussion above, they also point to broader structural changes such as increased variety 
of real estate investment products, a growing investor appetite for alternative asset types and new 
geographical markets and major changes within the core retail, office and industrial sectors.   
 
Before assessing the third party property management sector in the UK, it is worth noting that there is 
little to distinguish the UK fund and asset management sector from the broader global market.  Perhaps, 
the most pertinent point to reiterate is that most categories of investing institution have a significance 
presence in the UK. Parker et al. (2018) provide an overview of the structure of the real estate fund 
management sector focusing on the distinction between whether asset ownership is retained by the client 
or handed over to the fund manager with the client investing in a real estate fund.   They identify 
different motivations and reward structures with listed vehicles focussed on shareholder value and 
private funds focussed on fee income.  They point out that some real estate operational management 
activities lend themselves to being outsourced and briefly discuss a number of familiar considerations 
in the outsourcing decision around cost, control, communication, expertise, flexibility and conflicts of 
interest.  Their conclusion is that  
 
“[A]s individual situations differ, there is no simple guide to the decision whether to use 
outsourced service providers or in-house staff.  Often, some combination of the two models 
is adopted by fund managers…While the adoption of a wholly in-house business model by 
a fund manager is now effectively non-existent” (Parker et al., 2018, 125)       
 
The Third Party Property Management Sector in the UK 
 
In terms of the supply-side for property management services, in the UK there are two main categories 
of third party solutions. A small number of providers (e.g. Workman, MJ Mapp) have a fairly narrow 
set of offerings specialising in property management on a stand-alone basis.   Much more well-known, 
other global full-service providers (Cushman & Wakefield, Savills, CBRE, JLL) offer a much more 
comprehensive range of services to support a variety of real estate operational management processes. 
This range of services has expanded significantly as the demand for improved real estate operational 
management capability from their clients (real estate investment managers) has grown.  Possibly 
reflecting increased vertical integration of the supply chain, CBRE’s acquisitions of FM service 
providers such as Global Workspace Solutions and FacilitySource and M&E specialists such as Norland 
are symptomatic of the changing landscape in outsourced real estate operational management. 
Comparable acquisitions by Cushman and Wakefield of Quality Solutions and by JLL of Integral are 
also indicative this shift.  
 
There is very little documented knowledge about the nature of the property management sector in the 
UK.  A notable exception is a study by RealService for the British Council for Offices in 2015 on 
occupier satisfaction.  Their research identified relatively high negative perceptions of the property 
management sector by occupiers.  A number of findings stood out.  Compared to many other business 
services, occupiers perceived that there had been little innovation in property management. In terms of 
their overall experience of occupying buildings, property management was identified by occupiers as 
the area that required most improvement.  Despite the consolidation in the wider real estate services 
sector, the property management industry was perceived to be heavily fragmented with many suppliers, 
making it difficult to achieve economies of scale and to achieve thought leadership through innovation.  
Other problems identified were a lack of industry standard systems and business processes.  The result 
is that property management processes were perceived to be inefficient and labour intensive.  
 
In the same study, in summaries of comments from focus groups, property managers were arguing that 
the increasing expectations on health and safety, environmental issues, client reporting and occupier 
engagement placed on them by clients and occupiers had never been greater.  Overall, the findings were 
consistent with a perception that the sector has increasingly been commoditised and has evolved into a 
relatively low skill, low margin and low status function in the real estate services supply chain.  There 
is anecdotal evidence to suggest that these typical perceptions among occupiers are also held by the 
investors.  More recently, prominent real estate industry figures have questioned the current strategic 
and operational resilience of the property management supply network used by many investment 
managerss. For instance, in 2018 Bill Hughes, Head of Real Assets at Legal and General Investment 
Managers (one of the top five in terms of real estate assets under management in the UK), argued that      
…the existing presumption of outsourced property management is no longer fit for purpose and 
needs to change…The decision to outsource property management is commonly propelled by the 
property owner requirements to reduce costs and save time.  In reality it’s left with a managing agent 
in the middle who, very often, does not have the motivation or skillset to look after the needs of the 
occupier or run a building efficiently…With a growing body of legislation covering energy 
consumption, waste and its reduction, there is an increasing burden on the managing agents to 
provide services that they are not equipped to offer. The Property Manager function now needs to 
actively participate in customer service, facilities maintenance and engineering, sustainability and 
CSR strategic thinking – not to mention rent collection and day-to-day maintenance. The emergence 
of these areas for property owners shines a spotlight on the existing industry skills gap. 
 
Sponsored by CBRE (a major supplier of third party property management services), Fick (2015) 
analysis aimed to challenge the “orthodoxy” of in-house property management by US REITs.  The 
broad argument is that hardly any REITs can achieve the economies of scale of major third prarty 
providers and that the professed advantges o of in-house management are largely unproiven.  The main 
arguments for insourced property management models such as branding, enhanced control, staff 
cohesion and co-ordination, entrepreneurship, property management as a profit centre and scale 
economies are challenged.  In turn, a number of benefits of outsourced property management such as 
economies of scale in purchasing, contracting and human resource efficiencies that only large scale 
external managers can generate are proposed.  It is argued that quality assurance will be more robust in 
third party models which are more likely to have more standardised systems and metrics.  The ability 
to flexibly adjust the portfolio in response to strategic shifts in portfolio composition is then proposed.   
 
Using a qualitative, interview-based research method, Falkenbach et al. (2017) investigated the costs 
and benefits of outsourcing property management for 15 institutional investors in UK, Netherlands and 
Finland.  They concluded that it was the commonalities between models and investors rather than the 
divergences that dominated.  They also found that the perceived costs and benefits of third party 
property management solutions corresponded with many of the factors identified in the broader 
outsourcing literature and in Fick (2015).  Key advantages recognised were the ability to transfer fixed 
into variable costs and, consequently, to externalise the operational risks involved in portfolio 
rebalancing. In addition, third party providers can benefit from economies of scale in aggregating the 
portfolios of a range of clients.  It was also recognised that third party solutions provided opportunities 
for investors to gain access to expertise in specialist areas (e.g. sustainability, data management, health 
and safety).  Arms-length relationships with third party providers were believed to enable more robust 
quality assurance and performance monitoring.  However, it is notable cost savings did not emerge as 
a key issue. Indeed, a frequent observation focused on the need to balance quality of service with 
pressures to generate operational efficiencies.  
 
Focussing on outsourced property management in the US residential real estate sector, Read et al. 
(2016) investigate two main research questions using qualitative, interview based methods. The first 
question focussed on the extent to which property managers view fee structures, reporting requirements 
and incongruent managerial philosophies as significant sources of conflict when working with 
institutional asset managers. The second considered the extent to which large property management 
firms are proactively taking steps to mitigate such conflicts where and when they are perceived to exist.  
It was found that best-in-class apartment management companies were combating fee compression and 
commodification in their industry by promoting the value-add nature of their services.  Third party 
property managers were also found to be increasingly working with their clients to design non-
traditional fee structures that appropriately incentivise all members of the management team to work 
toward defined strategic objectives. In addition, increased reporting requirements driven by 
institutionalization of the sector were being facilitated by digital technologies.   
 
Real estate operational management models in practice 
 
Insourced Approaches 
 
In the UK, a significant number of real estate investors tend to use primarily insourced operational 
management models. A mainly insourced model is found for large traditional estates,  Large contiguous 
tracts of prime central London real estate are owned by, what are often termed, traditional, landed or 
settled estates such as the Crown Estate, Cadogan Estate, Howard de Walden Estate, Grosvenor and 
Portman Estate that, despite their prima facie similarity, adopt different operating models. As one of 
the largest in scale, Grosvenor’s property management model also involves in-house delivery 
augmented by the bulk purchase of specialist services from external contractors and, for particular lease 
events, flexibility for asset managers to instruct third party providers or deliver in-house on an ad hoc 
basis. Third party delivery of specialist services is typically organised through a small number of 
mandated suppliers for each externally sourced specialist service. In addition, there is also an evolving 
trade-off between commercialism and stewardship. Until recently, Grosvenor have reportedly run their 
property management services at a loss.  This seems to reflect their proto-patrician origins and desire 
to be perceived as a fair landlord. 
 
A key determinant of this insourced operating model seems to be the geographical concentration of the 
portfolio.  In particular, similar to a shopping centre, there is a perceived need to manage and control 
highly spatially concentrated, neighbourhood-scale, clusters of assets often in fairly small lots. This 
creates both operational efficiencies and inefficiencies. The spatial concentration provides economies 
of scale due to agglomeration-type economies whilst the small lot sizes produces higher operational 
costs per unit of space.  For assets in the same neighbourhoods that are owned by third parties, 
Grosvenor will also offer property management services.  However, this is a fairly minor part of their 
assets under management.   
 
At the time of writing Cadogan Estates have a slightly larger estate than Grosvenor with typically larger 
lot sizes.  It is worth approximately £6 billion at time of writing.  Whilst it is also spatially concentrated, 
the estate is less amalgamated in that the estate tends to own blocks of assets along major thoroughfares 
such as King’s Road rather than whole neighbourhoods.   They operate what they describe as a hybrid 
model for property management.  For the non-income producing properties (mainly long leasehold 
residential assets) for which the estate is responsible for property management, this function is 
outsourced to 10-15 third party providers.  However, the property and asset management for income-
producing assets (both residential and commercial) is delivered in-house.  It is perceived that in-house 
delivery is optimal because of the need to build customer relationships, control and ensure service 
quality.  Whilst dozens of specialist contractors will deliver many of the services, with most customers 
within a ten minute walk of the owner’s offices, it is felt to be important to maintain a ‘direct line’ with 
the customer to maximise income.  Similarly, internal asset managers will be responsible for capital 
and leasing transactions with the flexibility for asset managers to use retained or non-retained third 
party providers or deliver in-house on an ad hoc basis               
 
Also largely insourced, another interesting apparent contrast in operating models is between Landsec 
and British Land. Recently overtaken by SEGRO in terms of market capitalisation, historically both 
companies have been the largest listed real estate investment and development companies in the UK 
with an asset base spread across sectors and, almost exclusively UK, geographies.  Whilst both delivered 
core property and asset management functions in-house, their operating models diverged in the last two 
decades.  Landsec’s operating model has remained largely stable whilst its portfolio has become more 
concentrated and specialised in terms of the location and size of its asset base. British Land has had a 
similar rationalisation of its asset base. However, following its development of Broadgate in central 
London, in 1986 British Land set up a subsidiary (Broadgate Estates) to deliver property management 
functions. This subsidiary increased in size as it took on property management mandates from owners 
in the vicinity of Broadgate.  As the subsidiary expanded, British Land decided that they would procure 
all their property management through Broadgate Estates. The result was that Broadgate Estates became 
responsible for the property management of their assets as well as those of third parties.  Their argument 
for outsourcing to a single wholly owned subsidiary was that it would enable them to rapidly capture 
and transfer best practice learnings across their portfolio.   
 
By 2016, Broadgate Estates had grown into a team of 500 people managing 83 assets across the UK, 
approximately half of which were owned by British Land. The third-party portfolio comprised contracts 
to manage 28 locations in London and Liverpool for 14 clients. In 2018, Broadgate Estates was sold by 
British Land to a full-service global real estate advisory firm – Savills1.  However, only the third party 
 
1 In 2016, Savills also acquired GBR Phoenix Beard - a leading specialist property management services firm 
business was sold.  The property management of British Land’s portfolio was effectively back-sourced 
with the company now delivering property management internally.  The rationale seems to be that in a 
progressively competitive market (especially for shopping centres), it has become increasingly 
important for British Land to build relationships with and to improve their organisational knowledge of 
their customers. With increasing priority put on ensuring that existing tenants are satisfied and potential 
tenants are attracted, there seems to be an embryonic but growing challenge to the outsourcing model.    
 
It is difficult to see any significant exceptions to the rule that UK REITs insource the operational 
management of their portfolios. Both sector specialists such as SEGRO, INTU and Hammerson and 
location specialists such as Great Portland Estate and Derwent London deliver asset and property 
management in-house.  Reflecting the conventional arguments for in-house delivery, Great Portland 
Estates state in their Annual Report that 
 
“We consider that a close relationship with our occupiers is vital to our success. As a result, 
we manage all aspects of our property portfolio in-house, enabling us to continually refine 
our understanding of what occupiers want and how we can meet their needs.” (Great 
Portland Estates, 2018, 42)        
    
Hybrid Approaches   
 
In the UK, there is an almost universal operating model for the third party investment management 
sector for real estate operational management. Without exception, this involves insourcing the vast 
majority of fund and asset management functions and outsourcing the vast majority of property and 
facilities management functions to third party providers. Comprising mainly of insurance companies, 
fund houses, investment managers, specialist real estate investment managers, and investment banks, it 
is difficult to identify any exceptions to this model.  Typically managing shifting, multi-sector, 
geographically diversified real estate portfolios, the business focus is on the analytical, complex and 
higher margin business processes associated with asset and fund management.  Even where specialist 
real estate funds are launched and managed, the emphasis is on maintaining the culture of a high status, 
knowledge intensive and well-remunerated core workforce.  Low margin and largely commoditised 
functions such as property management and fund administration are then outsourced.   Property 
management, facilities management and other specialist real estate operational management services 
are effectively subcontracted to external suppliers.  Kevin Bould of Royal London Asset Management 
succinctly sums up the purported rationale for this fairly typical operating model. 
 
  “Contract management does not always sit easily with fund managers who view this work 
as important but dull. It is however a vital element of every successful property fund as 
getting it wrong can increase workload and distract the team from our key objective of 
generating outperformance. RLAM has sought to outsource non-core functions where we 
cannot add value, allowing the team to devote resources where it really matters, adapting 
our approach dependent upon the materiality of every contract. This in turn allows fund 
and asset managers to concentrate their efforts to maximise the impact upon investment 
returns.” (Royal London Asset Management, 2015, 10)  
 
For property management, as noted above, Falkenbach et al. (2017) argued that these investing 
institutions are essentially prepared to absorb the ‘costs’ of outsourcing such as reduced control, 
mediated relationships with tenants, potential information leakage, potential shirking, loss of potential 
income stream and other potential conflicts of interest.  In return, they implicitly judge that the perceived 
‘benefits’ of third party solutions such as operational flexibility, ability to focus on core competencies 
and higher margin activities, access to specialist knowledge and lower headcount outweigh the 
disadvantages. Whilst the potential for economies of scale and operational efficiencies from third party 
delivery is recognised, it is notable that cost reduction has generally not been perceived as an advantage 
of third party solutions. Rather the key concern seems to be the calibration between service quality and 
cost.     
 
An interesting exception to the pattern of geographically concentrated portfolios insourcing property 
management is the Crown Estate.  Although they own approximately the same amount of real estate 
assets in central London (by value) as Grosvenor and Cadogan Estates with little difference in spatial 
concentration, they have opted to outsource their property management to a full-service real estate 
advisory firm.  In 2015, Crown Estate appointed JLL to oversee Regent Street Management Direct 
(RSMD) for a five year period.  Essentially the terms of the contract saw JLL ‘white label’ their property 
management service under the RSMD brand responsible for property and facilities management and 
day-to-day relations with the occupiers on Regent Street.  Crown Estate retained asset management 
functions in-house.  However, their wider portfolio is more diverse with the central London assets 
accounting for approximately 55% by value.  Other commercial real estate and agricultural holdings 
are quite widely dispersed throughout the UK.  A relatively small range of third party providers of 
property management services are mandated for this element of the portfolio.   
 
In terms of the procurement model for third party property management services, there is significant 
variation among investing institutions in terms of number of suppliers, performance metrics and the use 
of incentives and penalties.  Whilst some investing institutions use a single supplier, ‘one stop shop’ 
approach and other have dozens of suppliers, an optimal operational model seems to be emerging.  This 
involves a relatively small number of third party suppliers (4-6).  This model reduces supplier risk 
associated with having a single provider whilst also lowering the costs associated with managing dozens 
of external supplier relationships. The flexibility to use whoever is identified as the best provider in a 
specific sector or market is retained. In addition, competitive tension is maintained by having the ability 
comparing pricing and performance among suppliers. Further, the quality of service is likely to be 
enhanced when the institution’s mandate is of a sufficient scale to ensure that they remain a key client 
of the supplier.  Multiple suppliers also ensures that the capacity for knowledge sharing and exchange 
of good practice is preserved.   
 
Outsourced Approaches 
 
The final broad category of real estate operational management model is to outsource responsibility for 
fund, asset, property and facilities management to third party providers. This is closely linked to the 
hybridised model outlined above.  Many of the organisations that adopt hybrid models act as direct third 
party providers of fund and asset management to investment organisations that outsource these 
activities.  These investment management firms are, in turn, responsible for the procurement of other 
real estate services from other third party providers. In the UK, the client investing organisations will 
retain ownership of the assets appointing third party investment managers who normally act as quasi-
general contractors. With the third party investment manager delivering asset and fund management 
services, they typically sub-contract property management, facilities management and other specialist 
real estate services to a range of third party providers.  In turn, the property and facilities managers may 
sub-contract some specialist services to other suppliers.  This is analogous to the construction sector 
where main contractors have a direct commercial relationship with a client are termed Tier 1. Sub-
contractors and suppliers with a direct contract with the Tier 1 main contractor are termed Tier 2. Sub-
contractors and suppliers working for sub-contractors are termed Tier 3 and Tier 3 sub-contractors also 
employ suppliers and sub-contractors, so in many cases there can be a fourth or even fifth tier involved 
in delivery (Department for Business Innovation and Skills, 2013). 
 
In the wider investment sector, it is possible that the relative importance of outsourcing may decline.  
Rozanov (2017) identified a secular shift in so-called best-in-breed sovereign wealth funds and large 
public pension funds towards building and expanding internal portfolio management capabilities.  For 
instance, Oxford Properties invests in and manages real estate assets in the UK as a subsidiary of the 
Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement System, one of Canada's largest pension funds. In a large, 
local (to the author’s university) business park in Reading, asset management functions were delivered 
by Oxford Properties by on-site staff.  However, property management functions were outsourced to a 
specialist in property management (themselves taken over in 2018 by a full service real estate advisory 
firm – see below).  Adopting a white labelling model, the property management service, however, was 
branded with the business park rather than with the service provider.       
      
Conclusion 
 
Across the real estate investment sector, many markets have continued to mature and become more 
sophisticated.  The real estate investment management sector and associated third party providers of 
real estate services to deliver real estate operational management functions have expanded their 
operations. The globalisation of commercial real estate markets and the investment management sector 
has significantly changed the commercial real estate investment landscape. Over the last two decades, 
a secular shift towards outsourcing more and more elements of real estate operational management has 
been a key factor in the growth of third party service providers. As the composition and business models 
of investment organisations and service providers have evolved, changing regulatory, user and investor 
requirements, increasingly complex buildings, the emergence of ‘alternative’ real estate asset classes 
and structural change in conventional real estate asset classes are driving continuing change in the 
processes involved in the operational management of commercial real estate portfolios.             
 
Whilst categorisation of investor type can be challenging, a range of operating models are used in the 
operational management of real estate portfolios. With the exceptions of specialist real estate investment 
managers, specialists in real estate tend to view most operational management functions as core 
competencies and critical operational capabilities. Their operating model is highly vertically integrated.  
In contrast, major (multi) asset owners such as national pension and sovereign wealth funds tend to 
have a vertically disintegrated real estate operational model with fund, asset, property and facilities 
management often outsourced to external investment managers. This can be done indirectly by investing 
in private and public pooled vehicles and transferring both asset ownership and management to third 
parties.  Alternatively, it can be executed directly through separate account mandates where ownership 
is retained and operational management is outsourced.  Capital aggregators or investing institutions 
such as fund houses, investment banks, insurance companies and specialist real estate investment 
advisors offer both options to investors. Over the last two decades, these capital aggregators seem to 
have converged upon a single operating model for real estate operational management with high margin, 
analytical tasks such as fund and asset management functions being insourced and low margin, routine 
functions such as property and facilities management being outsourced.  The degree of convergence in 
terms of operating model within the various investor categories would suggest that the operating models 
are optimal for their specific business models.        
 
In the UK specifically, it is apparent that real estate investment organisations with highly geographically 
concentrated portfolios tend to insource. The customer is close and, similar to shopping centres, they 
wish to curate and control clusters of assets.  Investment organisations who regard themselves as real 
estate specialists also tend to insource the core functions of property, asset and fund management. All 
the major REITs, some of whom are sector specialists, tend to insource.  The clear exception here the 
large specialist real estate investment managers such as AEW, CBRE Global Investors and Lasalle 
Investment Management.    Given that CBRE Global Investors manage real estate and infrastrucutre 
investment worth $106 billion for nearly 600 institutional clients from 32 offices in over 20 countries, 
it is unlikely to be optimal to create a property management capability in each market. Like the specialist 
real estate investment managers, multi-asset investment managers invariably tend to outsource property 
management and deliver asset and fund management in-house. Although the effectiveness of this model 
is starting to be questioned, it is difficult to find any exceptions to this pattern. In the UK, in 2011, the 
last hold-out (M&G) ‘lifted and dropped’ their property management team into CBRE.  
 
Looking ahead tentatively, there is embryonic evidence of some potentially significant shifts.  Whilst 
the large full-service firms have been increasing their range of services in response to investor demands, 
there seems to be significant dissatisfaction with third party property management.  Perhaps peak 
outsourcing has been reached.  Large asset owners are increasing insourcing fund management reducing 
separate account mandates.  Structural changes in the real estate market, particularly in shopping centres 
and office markets, may mean that pro-active, customer-focused and entrepreneurial management will 
become an increasingly critical capability that is less likely to be outsourced. The emergence of white 
labelling models may begin to blur the boundaries between in-house and outsourced operating models.  
Invariably, digitisation will continue to increase the supply of and demand for the provision of data, 
information and, consequently, actionable intelligence.        
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Table 1  
 
 
  
Table 2 Real Estate Investors: Business and Operating Models 
 
Investor category
Geographical 
focus
Sector focus Asset focus Business focus Examples
Typical property 
management 
procurement
Typical asset 
management 
procurement
Sovereign wealth fund International Diversified Multi-asset Investment only Norges. GIC.  ADIA. China Investment Corp.  Outsourced Outsourced
Investment bank International Diversified Multi-asset
Full-service investment 
banks 
Goldman Sachs,  Deutsche Bank.  Credit Suisse.  
UBS.  
Outsourced Insourced
Fund house International Diversified Multi-asset Investment management.   
Schroders. M&G.  Invesco. Columbia 
Threadneedle.  Blackrock
Outsourced Insourced
Investment/asset 
manager
International Diversified Multi-asset Investment management.   Insight Investment.  Hermes.  Outsourced Insourced
Occupational pension 
fund
International Diversified Multi-asset Investment only.  
USS.  BT Pension Scheme.  Electricity Supply 
Pension Scheme.
Outsourced Insourced
Large private real 
estate co.
International Diversified Real estate
Invetment.  Investment 
Management.  Real estate 
development.  Property 
Management.  
Hines.  Tishman Speyer. Insourced Insourced
Private equity International Diversified Multi-asset Investment maangement Blackstone.  Carlyle Group.  Permira. Outsourced Insourced
Family office International Diversified Multi-asset Investment only
HSBC Private Wealth Solutions.  UBS Global 
Family Office. Sandaire. Stanhope Capital
Outsourced Outsourced
Charitable foundation International Diversified Multi-asset Investment only
Wellcome Trust.  Garfield Weston Foundation.  
Church Commissioners.
Outsourced Outsourced
Specialist real estate 
investment manager
International Diversified Real estate
Real estate investment 
management
CBRE Global Investors.  Lasalle Investment 
Management.  Brookfield. Tristan Capital.
Outsourced Insourced
REIT/listed real estate 
co.
National or 
regional
Diversified 
or specialised 
Real estate
Real estate investment and 
development
Landsec.  British Land.  Segro.  INTU.  
Hammerson.  Unibail-Rodamco-Westfield
Variable Insourced
Traditional estate
National or 
regional
Diversified 
or specialised 
Real estate 
Real estate investment and 
development 
Cadogan Estates. Grosvenor. Crown Estate. Variable Insourced
Closed/open ended 
real estate fund
Highly variable 
Diversified 
or specialised 
Real estate Real estate investment Largely products of fund houses. See above. Outsourced Insourced
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